Is Mental Process Non-Computable? by Stapp, Henry P.
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
95
02
01
1v
1 
 1
4 
Fe
b 
19
95
December 14, 1994 LBL-36346
Is Mental Process Non-Computable? ∗
Henry P. Stapp
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory
University of California
Berkeley, California 94720
Abstract
It has recently been claimed that certain aspects of mental processing
cannot be simulated by computers, even in principle. The argument is
examined and a lacuna is identified.
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1. Introduction
Roger Penrose has recently published an argument1 that seeks to establish that
mathematicians, when they come to know mathematical truths, cannot in all
cases be relying solely on processes that can be adequately simulated by ideal-
ized computers. Within the framework of science this is a startling claim, for
contemporary mainstream scientific thought holds that mental processing inso-
far as it leads to overt behaviour is an aspect of physical processes happening
mainly in the brain, and that these processes are governed by the mathematical
laws of classical and quantum physics, and hence should be able to be simulated
to arbitrary accuracy, at least in principle, by computers, provided no practical
limitations whatsoever are imposed. Penrose’s argument seeks to refute this.
Moreover, the argument is claimed to be close to rigorous. Thus it is claimed,
in effect, that almost rigorous argumentation is able to demolish some tenets
of mainstream scientific thought, and to demonstrate that fundamentally new
ideas are therefore required. This conclusion, if valid, would be a breakthrough
of major importance in science.
2. Penrose’s Argument
1. Let Cq(n), for q ranging over some infinite set Rq, be a listing of all
computational processes that depend on one natural-number argument n. For
each pair (q, n) the computational process Cq(n) either stops, or never stops.
(Example. C7(n) might be: Find the smallest integer N ≥ 0 that is not a sum
of n numbers each of which is a square of a natural number, 0, 1, 2, 3, .... For
n ≥ 4 no systematic search for N will ever stop, according to a theorem due to
Lagrange)
2. Proceed by reductio ad absurdum: Assume that if, for some pair (q, n),
we can know that Cq(n) can never stop then we can know this only by means of
some reasoning processes that, because it is the reflection of an underlying brain
process, can be assumed to be a computational process that yields an answer,
and thus stops (because it can be programmed to stop when it yields an answer).
Thus the reductio ad absurdum assumption is that if, for some pair (q, n), we
can know that Cq(n) can never stop then there must be some computational
process A(q, n) such that:
‘A(q, n) stops’ implies ‘Cq(n) can never stop’.
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3. If A(q, n) is defined for every pair (q, n) (see below) then A(n, n) is a
computational process that depends on one argument, n. Then there must be
an index k such that:
A(n, n) = Ck(n).
4. Therefore, according to the assumption of line 2,
‘Ck(k) stops’ implies ‘Ck(k) can never stop’.
5. Therefore,
Ck(k) can never stop.
6. But (by line 3) Ck(k) = A(k, k), and hence (by line 5) ‘A(k, k) can never
stop’.
7. Thus we have found out that ‘Ck(k) can never stop’, yet the knowledge
that ‘Ck(k) can never stop’ is not entailed by line 2.
8. We conclude that the A(k, k) occurring in line 2 for the case (q, n) =
(k, k) is not unique: there must be an A1(k, k) 6= A(k, k) whose stopping entails
that ‘Ck(k) never stops’. (Penrose specifies that the stopping of A(q, n) is merely
a sufficient condition for C(q, n) never to stop, not a necessary and sufficient one.
Hence there might be several different processes Am(k, k) any one of which could
serve as the A(k, k) in line 2.)
9. If there were only a finite number of processes Am(k, k) such that the
stopping of any one of them would allow us to know that Ck(k) can never
stop then one could define the A(k, k) in line 2 to be the process that stops if
and only if any one of these Am(k, k)’s stops. Then one would get the desired
contradiction: We would know (by line 5) that ‘Ck(k) can never stop’, yet (by
line 6) that the unique computational process whose stopping would (according
to line 2) allows us to know this fact can never stop.
Penrose1 has argued that all of the Am(q, n) whose stoppings can allow
us to know that C(q, n) can never stop, as specified in line 2, can indeed be
amalgamated into one single A(q, n). In this case, the assumption in line 2
becomes: for any pair (p, n), if “ ‘Cp(n) can never stop’ is knowable” then
“A(q, n) stops”, and, conversely, for any pair (p, n), if “A(p, n) stops” then “ ‘
C(p, n) can never stop’ is knowable” Thus we have the equivalence: for every
pair (p, n),
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“A(p, n) stops” iff “ ‘C(p, n) never stops’ is knowable”
Since whatever is knowable is (presumably) true the argument can then
proceed as indicated above, with a contradiction appearing after line 6. However,
there is a question about line 3, to which we now turn.
3. Indices and Arguments
Let us consider a set of processes Sq(n), where q ranges over an infinite
set Rq. It is useful to make a distinction between an index, represented by a
subscript, and an argument, represented by a variable enclosed by parentheses.
The dependence on an argument is supposed to be one in which some finitely-
stated rule covers the infinite set of values that the argument (for example, the
natural number n) is allowed to take on, whereas the dependence on an index
is supposed to be one that is expressed by means of a case-by-case listing of the
infinite set of individual cases. In the former case, the various possible values
of the argument are elements of a coherent mathematical structure (e.g., the
set of natural numbers), which makes it possible for one finitely-stated rule to
cover the infinite number of possible values of the argument. But in the latter
case the full identity of the index is specified, say, by its shape: the symbol is
identified exclusively by an intrinsic identifying characteristic, not by means of
the logical connections of this symbol to the other ones. Thus one could use *,
!, ?, [, ... for these intrinsically characterized symbols, instead of 0, 1, 2, 3, ... ,
to indicate their lack of logical relatedness to one another.
The processes Cq(n) were introduced by Penrose by listing all of the different
computational processes C(n) that are functions of the single (natural-number)
argument n:
C0(n), C1(n), C2(n), C3(n), C4(n), C5(n), . . . .
This way of introducing the set of Cq(n) might suggest that q is an index, and
hence that, in my notation, it is properly written as a subscript, which is how
Penrose writes it.
In this case, where the set of all possible Cq(n) is indexed by the set of
subscripts q, where q ranges over a set Rq of pure symbols, the set of processes
A(q, n) should be written rather as Aq(n): the set of symbols q would be merely
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a set of indices, each of which has an identity, but no logical relationship (apart
from ‘different from’) to the others. Hence no rule apart from direct case-by-case
listing is possible for specifying the dependence on q.
If one were to adhere to this point of view, that the symbols q are merely
indices, then Penrose’s argument would collapse. For, it would make no sense
to say that a pure symbol, say ∗, is equal to some natural number n. If one
were, in spite of this logical point, simply to set up a convention whereby the
pure symbols were represented by natural numbers in some haphazard way then
one could not expect to derive anything useful. One could then, to be sure,
formally consider the set of processes An(n), as n runs over the set of natural
numbers. But this set could not coincide, for some k, with the set of Ck(n)’s,
for all n, because the dependence of An(n) upon the subscript n is not of the
argument type, whereas for each value of q the dependence of Cq(n) upon n is
of the argument type, by definition. Thus a key step in Penrose’s argument,
namely line 3, would fail.
Penrose certainly recognized that he would not obtain a valid argument
if the symbol q were an index-type of variable: he specified that q must be
regarded as an argument-type of variable, but did so without ever writing down
C(q, n). Once one writes C(q, n) instead of Cq(n) a question immediately arises:
How can one confirm that there is, in fact, a computational process C(q, n)
that depends on two arguments, and has the property that, as q runs over the
natural numbers, the process C(q, n) runs over the complete set of processes that
are functions of the other argument n? Specifically, if the set of all computable
processes of one (natural number) argument n is the set of Cp(n), with p running
over its range Rp, then how does one construct a finitely described computational
process C(q, n) that acts on two (natural-number) arguments q and n, such that
for every p in Rp there is a natural number qp such that C(qp, n) = Cp(n).
Penrose1 answers this question satisfactorily. He considers a Go¨del-type of
construction whereby one imagines that there is some rule whereby the sequence
of mathematical symbols that expresses the form of each computational process
Cp(n) is transcribed into some corresponding natural number qp, in such a way
that Cp(n) = C(qp, n) for each p in Rp.
Let it be granted, therefore, that Cq(n) can, in my notation, be replaced
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by C(q, n). Then the computability assumption (that must be shown to lead to
a contradiction) asserts that for every pair (q, n) such that “ ‘C(q, n) can never
stop’ is knowable” there is a computational process Aq,n that stops and is such
that:
“ ‘Aq,n stops’ implies ‘C(q, n) can never stop’ ”.
This condition is the (reductio ad absurdum) assertion that the only way that
one can know that ‘C(q, n) can never stop’ is by means of a mental process that
can be represented by a computational process1.
To complete the proof described in section 2 one must show that set of
processes Aq,n can be represented in the form A(q, n); i.e., that the dependence
of Aq,n on the two indices q and n can be represented by an argument-type
of dependence, not merely by an index-type dependence. An index-type of
dependence is all that one is allowed to assume, ab initio, without begging the
question.
A proof that this Aq,n has the form A(q, n) would allow one to justify line 3
of the proof. However, the assumption that there exists a fixed finitely stated rule
that maps the arguments (q, n) that identify any ‘process C(q, n) that can be
known never to stop’ ” onto “the process A by means of which it can be proved
that C(q, n) never stops” is a far more mind-boggling idea than the result that
is to be derived from this assumption. If it were true, it would mean that the
search for solutions of the various diverse and difficult individual problems in
number theory could in principle be avoided: there would exist a fixed finitely-
stated rule that maps the numbers that identify the problem to be solved (if it
can be solved) onto the very argument by means of which it can be solved. The
existence of such a general fixed finitely-stated rule for solving all of the soluable
problems in number theory goes far beyond what can reasonably be expected.
What this means is that the assumption that Aq,n can be written in the
form A(q, n) (i.e., that the dependence of the process Aq,n on the variables q
and n that identify C(q, n) is a fixed finitely-stated rule) begs the question: it
must be proved, not assumed.
4. Go¨delization
One might try to deal with this problem by exploiting the deep results
obtained by K. Go¨del2. In this connection it should be noted that the assumption
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in line 2 goes far beyond what was proved (in this connection) by Go¨del, who
claimed (in terms of the computer formulation used by Penrose) merely that
the set K of n such that “ ‘process C(n, n) never stops’ is provable”
is characterized by the statement
“C(k, n) stops”,
where k is some well defined number that is explicitly constructable within that
formalism.
This diagonalized version of the assumption in line 2 is all that is really
needed for the proof. So there is the possibility that a full Go¨del-type argument
might provide what is needed to complete the proof. But then Go¨del’s argument
pertaining to what is provable on the basis of certain mathematical rules known
to mathematicians must be carried over to what is knowable to human beings by
virtue of hypothesized mechanical rules of brain process. These latter rules act
at the atomic level, and they can never be known to human beings in the same
way that mathematical rules are known to mathematicians: what is knowable
to human beings rests on the coherency of what they are aware of, not on their
understanding of their own brain processess.
What Penrose is trying to refute is the hypothesis that what is knowable
to a human being is determined mechanically, in terms of brain activities that
are governed by mechanical rules. Since what we can know is presumeably a
mere surface activity of a far more extensive brain activity, it becomes impor-
tant to distinguish what we know, or can know, from the more extensive activity
upon which it rests. Within the computer framework that Penrose is using, a
conceivable model of the mind/brain could be this: the brain activity is repre-
sented by a mechanical/computer activity that stops from time to time, and the
output represents the conscious thought. This output is then fed back into the
computer as the next input. The machine is designed to produce outputs at a
fairly regular pace, and to terminate any procedure that does not give an output
reasonably quickly: brains must get answers out expeditiously if the organism
is to survive.
In applying a Go¨del-type argument to this mind/brain system the analog
of the mathematical rules in Go¨del’s work would be the rules that govern the ac-
tivity of the brain. The conclusion of the Go¨del-type argument (transcribed into
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the computer language) would be that there must be an allowed brain process
P that can never stop in spite of the fact that no system operating according
to the rules by which the brain operates could ever reach the conclusion that P
can never stop.
So the problem is: How can we reach this conclusion if no system operating
according to the rules that govern the actions of our brains could ever reach this
conclusion?
Although the hypothesized mechanical rules that govern brain action use
some elements of simple arithmetic, there is no need for them to use any process
that depends upon the use of the concepts “for all n”, or “there exists no n”, or
any other notion in which is imbedded the notion of infinity. The simple step-
by-step approximate integration of the discretized forms of differential equations
of classical and quantum physics does not encounter any need to answer infinite
numbers of questions: the questions it encounters are of the finite kind, such as
“what is 1+1 ?” In fact, every number that occurs in the constructive process of
solving these finite-difference equations is a finite number, and these numbers,
since they represent values that can occur in living brains, are restricted to
certain finite domains. However, this does not mean that the finite output
statements of these brains cannot include the finite strings of symbols that are
used by mathematicians to express propositions of number theory that refer to
infinite sets.
What happens to Go¨del’s proof if one replaces the mathematical rules that
are used in his argument by a strictly finitistic arithmetic that contains no
universal quantifiers such as “for all n . . . ”, and that restricts all numbers to
pre-specified finite sets. The answer is that the proof does not get off the ground,
for it rests heavily on the concept of “for all n” and an unbounded domain for
the natural numbers. Consequently, the assertion that there exists a k such
that:
“C(k, k) stops” iff “ ‘C(k, k) can never stop’ is knowable”
cannot be proved within the finitistic type of model of the mind/brain described
above. So this attempt to supply the missing relation Aq,n = A(q, n) fails.
The finite-type computer B that simulates the mechanical activity of the
human brain (and whose outputs at stopping points represent human thoughts)
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can be imbedded in a computer C whose rules of operation included implemen-
tation of the concept “ for all n”, and to which the Go¨del/Turing argument can
be applied. Then a (super-human) mind M that could comprehend both the
rules of operation of C and also the logic of the Go¨del/Turing proof would be
able to compute a value k such that the following proposition Pk is true:
“C(k, k) stops” iff “ ‘C(k, k) can never stop’ is knowableC”
where knowableC means knowable by virtue of the outputs of C. The mind M
that knows that Pk is true can know also that “X is knowableC” entails that
“X is true”, and can therefore conclude that “C(k, k) can never stop”. Thus M
can know more than what is knowableC . This is the analog of Go¨del’s theorem,
and is not a contradiction. On the other hand, the human mathematician can
know only the output of B. He will be able to reason, on the basis of what
the hypothetical M is able to know, that there exists some k (unknowable to
human beings) such that “C(k, k) can never stop”. However, it has not been
proved that the only way that he could know this is by virtue of the stopping of
C(k, k). The stopping of C(k, k) may be the unique process in C whose stopping
gives the strong result that “ ‘ C(k, k) can never stop’ is knowableC”, for the
particular value of k that is specified by the Go¨del/Turing argument. But no
proof is offered that there can be no process in B whose stopping could establish
the far weaker conclusion that “there exists a k such that Pk is true”, which is all
that is known to the human mathematician. Indeed, the human mathematician
reasons on the basis of the general assumptions and properties known to him,
and these do not include any knowledge of the details of the construction of
C. He obtains from his reasonings conclusions that do not refer to the specific
details of the construction of C, and that are therefore far weaker than the
strong conclusion available to M . Penrose does not show that there could be
no process in B whose stopping would yield this far weaker conclusion. In the
absence of such a demonstration no contradiction is established, and hence the
reductio ad absurdum argument fails to go through.
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